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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF
YOU DON’T: A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE’S TRILEMMA REGARDING
TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you, a police officer, are called to testify against
your supervisor who has demoted another police officer for arrest
ing your supervisor’s brother on felony warrants for dealing drugs.1
What are your options? You may truthfully testify and run the risk
of lawfully being fired as a result of your boss’s retaliation, refuse to
testify and face contempt of court for disobeying the subpoena, or
lie under oath and commit perjury.2 This was the plaintiff’s
trilemma in Morales v. Jones.3 Morales chose to testify truthfully,
and, fortunately, the court ruled that his deposition testimony was
protected.4 Not many public employees in Morales’s circumstances
are as lucky as he was, however. In the plethora of cases concern
ing a public employee’s protected speech, the subject of truthful
testimony presents an unsettled issue.5
When it comes to deciding the degree to which a public em
ployee’s truthful testimony should be protected, or if it enjoys any
1. See, e.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2007).
2. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (pointing
out the testifying dilemma that public workers face); cf. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg,
574 F.3d 696, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that testifying is part of a police officer’s job
duties; consequently his obligation to testify does not engender First Amendment pro
tection). See generally Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Pub
lic Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L.
REV. 939, 960 (2001) (asserting that public employees do not have an interest in rocking
the boat because they face public disapproval aside from the risk of losing their jobs).
3. Morales, 494 F.3d at 590-91.
4. Id. at 598 (“Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was unques
tionably not one of Morales’ job duties. . . .”).
5. Testimony is defined as “[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or
affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1613 (9th ed. 2009). Truthful testimony implies that the witness is telling the truth as he
understands it. On the other hand, false statements made knowingly, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, generally receive no First Amendment protection. See Hon.
Harvey Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Vehicle for Protecting Public
Employees’ Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 619, 653 n.213 (1995); Scott E.
Michael, “Lie or Lose Your Job!” Protecting a Public Employee’s First Amendment
Right to Testify Truthfully, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 413, 415 (2006) (demonstrating that the
courts disagree on the degree of protection a public employee’s truthful testimony
should enjoy).
623
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First Amendment protection,6 the courts are divided.7 In forming
their decisions, courts try to interpret the Supreme Court’s elusive
decisions, which, unsurprisingly, have led to inconsistent results.8
Indeed, courts’ rulings vary widely depending on their inter
pretation of speech involving a matter of public concern and
whether employee’s official duties compelled the testimonial
speech. Several courts have adopted a per se rule9 that truthful tes
timony in a court of law or administrative hearing constitutes pro
tected speech because it is inherently a matter of public concern.10
Under these circumstances, retaliatory dismissal would jeopardize
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the United States Constitu
tion states in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .” Id.
7. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 229 (ruling that a public employee’s truthful testimony is
automatically protected because every citizen has a duty to testify); Johnston v. Harris
Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1576-78 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that truthful
testimony deserves full First Amendment aegis because it is a per se matter of public
concern); Reeves v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“‘[The interest of the judicial system] along with the first amendment values, would
not be served’ if the fear of retaliation . . . ‘effectively muzzled’ witnesses testifying in
. . . court.” (quoting Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 (1982))). Compare Wright v.
Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505-07 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that truthful testimony deserves heightened but not per se protection), with Huppert,
574 F.3d at 708-10 (holding that truthful testimony, even when related to a matter of
public concern, is not protected so long as it is made pursuant to a public employee’s
official duties), and Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 445-47 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that truthful testimony is protected only when the content of the testimony
constitutes a matter of public concern). The First Amendment has been extended to
protect the right of witnesses to give truthful testimony. See Langley v. Adams Cnty.,
987 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The law is clearly established that the ‘First
Amendment protects the right to testify truthfully at trial.’” (quoting Melton v. City of
Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on reh’g en banc,
928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991))).
8. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (ruling that speech given pursu
ant to “official duties” is not protected); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 667 (1994)
(holding that the government may fire an employee if it reasonably believes that his
speech will potentially disrupt his effective job performance); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987) (determining that even inappropriate and controversial speech
is protected so long as it involves a matter of public concern); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding that a matter of public concern is measured “by the
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968) (positing that speech is protected if it
involves a matter of public concern and when the interest of the public employee in
commenting on such matter does not outweigh the government’s interest in efficiently
performing its duties).
9. “Per se” is defined as “[o]f, in, or by itself.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257
(9th ed. 2009).
10. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that responding
to a subpoena enjoys First Amendment protection much like truthful testimony, be
cause contextually it constitutes speech on a matter of public concern); Johnston, 869
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the integrity of the judicial process because the public employee
might be deterred from testifying by fear of retribution.11 Other
courts have held that truthful testimony deserves heightened but
not per se protection.12 Conversely, the courts that have refused to
grant First Amendment protection for truthful testimony have rea
soned that speech that relates to a public employee’s official duties
or his private interests is not safeguarded.13
Truthful testimony is a unique form of speech aimed at helping
the judiciary to arrive at the truth. Testimony is unique because “it
is every [citizen’s] duty to give testimony before a duly constituted
tribunal,”14 and the citizen does not have a choice over the content
of the testimony.15 The mission of our justice system is to ensure
equal justice under the law.16 What makes this goal possible is
searching for and discovering the truth.17 Truthful testimony is
therefore one of the crucial components in the proper functioning
of our judicial process, and its protection should play an essential
role in maintaining the integrity of the justice system.18 Truthful
testimony is not only a tool in revealing the truth, but, unlike other
forms of speech, it is also often mandatory because the witness is
obligated to testify or face the consequences.19
In the interest of protecting the judicial truth-seeking process,
this Note will argue that truthful testimony in general, and particu
larly compelled truthful testimony, should receive First AmendF.2d at 1578 (“When an employee testifies before an official government adjudicatory
or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is inherently of public concern.”).
11. Donatucci, 81 F.3d at 1291 (holding that an employee’s fear of retaliation may
lead to distorting the truth, which, in turn, would jeopardize the mission of our justice
system); Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578 (stating that “[w]e would compromise the integrity
of the judicial process if we tolerated state retaliation for testimony that is damaging to
the state” because employees may not be forthcoming out of fear of reprisal).
12. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1507 n.6 (“[E]xcept in the rarest of cases . . . , truthful
testimony is protected speech.”).
13. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the fact that speech was given during a hearing is immaterial so long as “the statement
was made not to further any public debate, but only to further the interests of the two
officers involved” (citing Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir.
1988))).
14. Ullmann v. Unitec States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956).
15. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 228 n.8 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is
axiomatic that ‘[e]very citizen . . . owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid
in the enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559
n.2 (1961))).
16. See Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 228.
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ment safeguards, and its protection should not be predicated on
“matters of public concern”20 or “official duties” tests.21 Instead,
truthful testimony should be immunized from job retaliation similar
to the way testimony has been immunized from damage claims.22
Part I of this Note will review the Supreme Court’s stance regarding
public employees’ speech. Part II will discuss the protection that
witness testimony enjoys from civil damage claims and will argue
that a public employee’s truthful testimony should receive the same
immunization.
Next, Part III will identify the lower courts’ divergent decisions
on the issue of truthful testimony pre-Garcetti and discuss the retal
iation that public employees face at work as a result of their truthful
testimonies. Part IV will discuss the lower courts’ split decisions
post-Garcetti. Part V will demonstrate the ramifications that legal
uncertainty has on this issue—not only on public employees, but on
the integrity of our judicial system and the functioning of our gov
ernment as a whole. Lastly, Part V will conclude that truthful testi
mony should be protected and afforded immunity from job
retaliation.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
A. Matter of Public Concern and the Balancing Act: Pickering/
Connick Test
An historical overview of the evolution of a public employee’s
speech reveals four distinct stages. Until the early 1950s, the Su
preme Court considered government employment a privilege, not a
right.23 From the mid 1950s until the late 1960s, the Court afforded
20. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that speech is a matter of
public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community”). The “matter of public concern” test has
received criticism because of its vagueness and the propensity of unpredictable results.
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J.
101, 115 (1995).
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communica
tions from employer discipline.”); Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v.
Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection For Public Employees, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 22, 22-23 (2008) (arguing for a very narrow application of Garcetti
while advocating for constitutional and international protection of public employees’
speech).
22. See infra Part IV.A.
23. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding a New York
statute which allowed the Board of Regents to terminate teachers who were members
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public employees greater First Amendment rights.24 During this
time the Court unambiguously favored the government, but recog
nized that its workers could not lose their constitutional rights by
virtue of their employment.25
The Supreme Court’s position regarding a public employee’s
freedom of speech, beginning in 1968 and continuing until 2006, de
noted a more balanced approach in determining public employees’
First Amendment rights. The Court’s rationale during this period
was that if a public employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of pub
lic concern, his speech would be protected, provided that the gov
ernment’s interest in functioning properly did not outweigh the
employee’s interest in commenting on these matters.26 In 2006, the
Court presented an additional test whereby, if a public employee
spoke pursuant to his official duties, his speech would not be pro
tected even if it addressed a matter of public concern.27
Pickering v. Board of Education, a landmark case, set the stan
dard for measuring the current parameters of a public employee’s
right to free speech under the First Amendment.28 Marvin Picker
ing was fired from his position as a school teacher because he pub
lished an article in the local newspaper criticizing the school board
and the superintendent for their mishandling of the proposals to
raise funds for the school.29 Pickering responded to his termination
by taking the matter to trial.30
Balancing both parties’ interests, the Supreme Court deter
mined that a government employer could not terminate an em
ployee for merely exercising his First Amendment right of speaking
of the Communist Party), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 593-94 (1967); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)
(“The [public employee] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.”), abrogated by Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06,
and Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06 (asserting the notion that public em
ployment may be denied on any terms, no matter how unreasonable, is no longer
viable).
25. Id.
26. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
27. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
28. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1069 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that Pickering is the first case to
recognize a public employee’s right to free speech). But in Pickering, the Court stated
that its ruling relied on a series of cases originating with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952), that denied the withholding of state employees’ salaries because of failure to
complete a loyalty oath. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
29. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65.
30. Id. at 565.
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on a matter of public concern.31 In the Court’s opinion, Pickering’s
article constituted a matter of public concern32 because “free and
open debate is [not only] vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate,” but also Pickering, as a citizen, taxpayer, and teacher,
had a civic stake and a free speech right to discuss whether school
funds were properly managed.33 By the same token, the state had a
prerogative to regulate an employee’s speech in the interest of its
efficient and proper functioning.34 The Court put both interests on
the scale, weighing the interest of the employee, speaking on mat
ters of public concern as a citizen on one hand, and on the other,
measuring the interest of the government as an employer in “pro
moting the efficiency” of public services.35 The balance shifted in
Pickering’s favor because, “absent proof of false statements,” it was
his right as a citizen to speak on matters “of public importance” and
his right trumped the school’s interest of functioning efficiently.36
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court further
redefined the outer-limits of public employees’ speech, asserting
that speech which touches on a matter of a public concern triggers
the Pickering balancing test.37 The plaintiff, an assistant district at
torney, on her own initiative, prepared and distributed a question
naire shortly after her supervisor informed her she was being
31. Id. at 574-75.
32. Matters of public concern include speech on “government corruption, racial
discrimination or—as in the case of teacher Marvin Pickering—how school boards allo
cate their funds between academics and athletics.” David L. Hudson, Jr., The Garcetti
Effect, Government Employees Fear High Court Case Undermines Retaliation Protec
tions, 94 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (2008).
33. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. Also, in justifying First Amendment protection,
the Court articulated that matters of public concern are of beneficial value to the public
at large, and that public employees are well-suited to comment on them. Id. at 572.
34. Id. at 568.
35. Id. at 566-68. The burden of showing that his interest as a citizen outweighs
the interest of his employer rests with the public employee who has to show that his
speech addressed a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-50
(1983). Once that is established, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the
justifications for the employee’s demotion or discharge. Id. at 150-51. When balancing
the employee’s right, the higher the level of public concern, the higher the need for the
government to bring forth a showing of disruption in the office. Id. at 152; Brown &
Kerrigan, supra note 5, at 653. These showings include:
(1) The need to maintain discipline or harmony among coworkers; (2) The
need for confidentiality; (3) The need to curtail conduct which impedes the
employee’s proper and competent performance of his daily duties; and (4) The
need to encourage a close and personal relationship between the employee
and his superiors, where the relationship calls for loyalty and competence.
Id.
36. Id. at 574.
37. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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transferred to a different department.38 The plaintiff’s supervisors
regarded the questionnaire as “a mini-insurrection,” fueled by her
resentment for her transfer.39 The Court determined that only one
out of the fourteen items on the questionnaire addressed a matter
of public concern.40 The rest of the questionnaire represented the
plaintiff’s personal dissatisfaction regarding internal office policy
and disapproval of her transfer.41
Accordingly, its content contained a minimal level of matter of
public concern and consequently the government’s proper function
ing received priority, making the plaintiff’s speech unworthy of
First Amendment protection.42 The Court specified that a matter
of public concern, in addition to the content, was also measured by
the “form[ ] and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record.”43 The context did not involve a matter of public
concern either, because the time, place, and manner in which the
plaintiff created the questionnaire favored the likelihood of office
disharmony.44 Consequently, due to the context, and because the
questionnaire represented a low level of public concern, the Court
ruled in favor of the government.45 Connick’s holding reflected the
view that the government has duties to perform, and if every issue
is regarded as a constitutional matter, the government’s perform
ance would suffer.46
In sum, the Pickering/Connick test established a two-step ap
proach in determining whether a public employee’s speech is pro
tected. The first step is to decide if the speech in question involves
a matter of public concern.47 If so, the court will balance the inter
est of the public employee’s speech against that of the government’s
interest in efficiently performing its duties.48 When the balance tips
38. Id. at 141.
39. Id. at 141, 151.
40. Id. at 148. Item eleven of the questionnaire asked: “Do you ever feel pres
sured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?” Id. at
155.
41. Id. at 148.
42. Id. at 154.
43. Id. at 147-48.
44. Id. at 152-53. The Court stated that context is determined by the time, place,
and manner of speech. Id.
45. Id. at 154.
46. Id. at 149.
47. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
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in favor of the public employee, the speech is protected; otherwise,
it is not.49
B. Inappropriate Speech, Yet Protected
Four years after Connick, the Court was confronted with the
question of whether a public employee’s inappropriate and contro
versial statement, which nonetheless fell within the realm of a mat
ter of public concern, deserved First Amendment protection.50 In
Rankin v. McPherson, the Court answered this question in the af
firmative, expanding the notion of safeguarded speech.51 In 1981,
Ardith McPherson worked as a data-entry employee in a county
constable’s office where she performed clerical duties.52 She had
heard about the attempted assassination of the United States Presi
dent Ronald Reagan on the radio.53 In the course of discussing the
President’s reform in reducing welfare programs with a co-worker,
she said: “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”54 This
statement caused her job termination.55
The Court ruled that McPherson’s comment, while inappropri
ate and controversial, viewed contextually, addressed a matter of
public concern because she uttered it while discussing the policies
of the President’s administration.56 However, the Court clarified
that unlike McPherson’s statement, a comment which amounts to
an imminent threat to kill the president enjoys no protection.57 In
the Court’s balancing act of the employee’s and the government’s
interests, McPherson came through victorious, mainly, because the
Court considered her utterance a matter of public concern.58 In ad
dition, the fact that she was a data-entry employee and served no
confidential policy-making role received substantial weight in her
favor, because in the Court’s view, the speech of a low-level em
ployee posed minimal risk to workplace efficiency.59
49. Id.
50. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1987).
51. Id. at 380, 386.
52. Id. at 378, 380.
53. Id. at 381.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 380.
56. Id. at 386-87.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 390-91 (“Where . . . an employee serves no confidential, policymaking,
or public contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that em
ployee’s private speech is minimal.”).
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C. Setting Procedural Guidelines
For the first time, in Waters v. Churchill, the Court introduced
and emphasized the importance of implementing reliable proce
dures when making adverse employment decisions.60 The plaintiff,
Cheryl Churchill, who worked as a nurse for a public hospital was
terminated after she allegedly made disruptive comments about her
department to a trainee nurse.61 Churchill, however, claimed that
she was fired because she disagreed with the hospital’s policies of
nurse cross training and commented that certain units were left un
derstaffed.62 The Waters v. Churchill Court explained that in defer
ence to its interest of functioning properly, the government may fire
an employee if it reasonably believes that his or her speech will po
tentially disrupt its effective performance.63 With this in mind, the
government can only dismiss an employee in good faith64 and, more
importantly, after a reasonable investigation.65 In addition, the
government’s greater control over a public employee’s speech
hinges on “the nature of [its] mission as employer.”66 The Court
did not, however, devise a detailed procedural test.67 Conse
quently, the courts, when faced with these issues, still employ a
case-by-case approach.
60. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994).
61. Id. at 664-65.
62. Id. at 666-67.
63. Id. at 677-78. The Court stated that reasonable care is “the care that a rea
sonable manager would use before making an employment decision—discharge, sus
pension, reprimand, or whatever else—of the sort involved in the particular case.” Id.
at 678. Instances of unreasonable actions would include disciplinary reprimands when
the evidence does not exist, or is “extremely weak . . . [or] when strong evidence is
clearly available—if, for instance, an employee is accused of writing an improper letter
to the editor, and instead of just reading the letter, the employer decides what it said
based on unreliable hearsay.” Id. at 677.
64. Id. The Court noted that “[i]t is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its
conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not
follow that good faith [alone] is sufficient” under the First Amendment. Id.
65. Id. at 677-78.
66. Id. at 674. The Court stated:
The government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively . . . as possible is
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the
government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achiev
ing its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate.
Id. at 675; see also Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 5, at 658 (“[The Court’s] holding [in
Waters] add[ed] a procedural step to an employer’s consideration of the impact of the
employee’s speech . . . .”).
67. Waters, 511 U.S. at 661.
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D. Garcetti and the Official Duty Standard
In 2006, faced once again with the issue of a public employee’s
free speech in the workplace, the Court introduced an additional
test to determine a worker’s First Amendment protection. Indeed,
the Garcetti Court posited that in order to be protected, besides
satisfying the matter of public concern requirement, a worker’s
speech could not stem from his “official duties.”68 Because—the
Court added—when public employees speak in the course of their
official duties, they do not speak in their capacity as citizens; thus,
the Constitution cannot protect them “from employer discipline.”69
In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attor
ney, wrote a memorandum recommending that his supervisors dis
miss a criminal case because his investigation revealed that the case
relied on “serious misrepresentations” on the part of the Los Ange
les County Sheriff’s Department.70 While Ceballos’s supervisors
decided to pursue the case despite his recommendation, Ceballos
was subjected to numerous retaliatory actions.71
In reaching its decision, the Court differentiated between em
ployee speech and citizen speech.72 The dispositive factor was that
Ceballos prepared the memorandum “pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy” and not in his capacity as a citizen.73 In writing
the memorandum, the Court noted, he simply complied with his
professional obligations and responsibilities.74 Consequently, limit
ing speech, derived from a public worker’s job, did not impinge
upon his First Amendment rights as a citizen.75 The Court con
68. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); see also Elisabeth Dale, Em
ployee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Cebal
los, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 175 (2008) (“[T]he Court in Garcetti defined
public employee speech rights in a way that may ultimately strengthen the hand of
public employees.”). But see Erwin Chemerinksy, The Rookie Year of the Roberts
Court and A Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 538-39 (2007) (“Surely
government employees do not give up their citizenship when they walk into the govern
ment office building. But to me there are real consequences of the [Garcetti] case and
why it is so misguided is that it is much less likely that wrongdoing will be exposed by
government employees.”).
69. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
70. Id. at 414. Ceballos’s memorandum stated that the deputy sheriff had falsi
fied an affidavit to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 413-14.
71. Id. at 414-15.
72. Id. at 424.
73. Id. at 421.
74. Id. at 424.
75. Id.
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cluded that this limitation was merely an expression of the govern
ment’s exercise of its managerial role.76
In addition, the Court determined that defining the meaning
of “official duties” would be unwarranted because a public em
ployee’s daily tasks often differ noticeably from his official job
description.77 Instead, the courts must follow a case-by-case in
quiry.78 The Court stated that the “official duties” rationale is
based on the attempt to avoid judicial interference in communica
tions between the government and its employees and to give the
public employer a degree of discretion in performing its duties.79
On the other hand, the Court emphasized the paramount impor
tance of exposing governmental corruption in a democracy and re
ferred to various appropriate mechanisms available to employees,
such as whistle-blower statutes,80 labor codes, and other constitu
76. Id. at 422.
77. Id. at 424-25. In the words of the Court:
Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an em
ployee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an
employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s
professional duties for First Amendment purposes.
Id.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 422-23.
80. Peter Katel, Protecting Whistleblowers, Do Employees Who Speak Out Need
Better Protection?, CQ RESEARCHER, Vol. 16, No. 12, 265, Mar. 31, 2006, available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/111203devine.pdf; The Federal Workforce: Observations
on Protections From Discrimination and Reprisal for Whistleblowing: Testimony Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (2001) [hereinafter The Federal Work Force] (state
ment of J. Christopher Mihm, Director, Strategic Issues), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01715t.pdf. However, possibly due to the “complexity of the
redress system” and the multiple ways employed to report these cases, “lacks a clear
picture” of the amount of whistleblowing retaliatory cases filed by federal employees.
Id.
On the federal level, there are about forty laws enacted to protect whistleblowers.
See Katel, supra. For some of the statutes, see generally, Merit System Principles Act
2002, 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006); Prohibited Personnel Practices Act 2008, 5 U.S.C. § 2302
(2006); Labor Management Relations Act, 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (2006); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006).
The federal employees of the executive branch can redress their grievances of dis
crimination or retaliation for whistleblowing in three ways. First, they may file their
complaints within their agencies. The Federal Workforce, supra, at 2. Next, they may
take them up with one of three administrative agencies; namely, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC); the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); and
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Id. These agencies are in charge of the investiga
tion or adjudication of public employees’ complaints. Finally, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the employees’ last resort. Id. However, federal
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tional obligations.81 But the Court stated that it refused the notion
of planting a constitutional seed behind every workplace speech.82
In sum, the current Supreme Court’s test on public employees’
speech provides that speech flowing from their “official duties” re
ceives no constitutional protection, even if it constitutes a matter of
public concern.83 Finally, the Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the narrower question of whether a public employee’s
truthful testimony is safeguarded. However, relying on the com
employees must exhaust the first two levels of grievances before appealing to the court.
Id. at 3. In 1978, Congress passed the first comprehensive whistleblower legislation
which promulgated the creation of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) as agencies responsible for the deliberation of
retaliatory complaints. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Eleven years
later, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) intended to improve the reprisal pro
cess came into effect. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12,
101 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 2302). Generally, the WPA statute
protects whistleblowers when reporting a violation of law, gross mismanagement, gross
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
or safety. Whistleblower Protection: Survey of Federal Employees on Misconduct and
Protection from Reprisal: Fact Sheet for the Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the Civil Ser
vice, H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service 1, n.1, n. 2 (1992) [hereinafter Survey of
Federal Employees on Civil Service], available at http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10/
147240.pdf. As to the structure of the administrative grievance bodies, the EEOC is the
body responsible for reviewing and hearing complaints that employees file within their
agencies. The Federal Workforce, supra, at 2-3. MSPB handles more serious cases such
as retaliatory actions leading to dismissal or transfer for more than fourteen days.
Other complaints, such as transfers or denial of promotions, can be filed with the OSC.
Id. at 3. If the OSC does not act within 120 days, whistleblowers can take their cases to
the MSPB. Id. An employer may appeal a MSPB or EEOC decision by filing with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a court of exclusive jurisdictions
over whistleblower cases. Id. Employees who work in the public health and safety
sectors can file their grievances directly with the Department of Labor (DOL).
The process of redressing First Amendment violations under the whistle-blower
statutes is cumbersome and has not proven effective. See Garcia, supra note 21, at 22
(“[S]tatutory protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and sometimes counter
productive for public employees.”); see also Federal Employee Redress: A System in
Need of Reform: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and
General Government, H. Comm. on Appropriations, 1-6 (1996) [hereinafter A System in
Need of Reform] (statement of Timothy P. Bowling, Associate Director, Federal Man
agement and Workforce Issues, General Government Division) (evidencing the ineffi
ciency of the whistleblower redress system), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/gg96110t.pdf; Federal Employee Redress: An Opportunity for Reform: Testimony
Before H. Subcomm. on the Civil Service, H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 1
6 (1995) [hereinafter An Opportunity for Reform] (statement of Timothy P. Bowling,
Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues, General Government Division),
available at http://161.203.16.4/papr2pdf/155680.pdf.
81. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425-26.
82. Id. at 426-27.
83. Id. at 421.
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mon law tradition, it has held that trial witnesses’ testimonies are
immune from damage claims. The following Section discusses the
rationale for this protection.
II. WITNESSES’ RIGHTS

AT

COMMON

LAW

At common law, trial witnesses enjoyed absolute immunity
from civil damage liability for their court testimonies.84 The pur
pose of this immunity was to avoid two types of self-censorship85—
refusing to testify and distorting the truth.86 As this Note will later
explore, a similar rationale should apply to the effort of protecting a
public employee’s truthful testimony from employer retaliation be
cause the truth-finding process compels this protection.
Overcoming self-censorship was so compelling at common law
that the rule afforded protection even to those who offered false
and malicious testimony.87 Indeed, the Court of Exchequer in Hen
derson v. Broomhead held “that no action will lie for words spoken
or written in the course of giving evidence,” regardless of their ma
licious nature.88 In Henderson, the plaintiff asserted a damages
claim against the defendant maintaining that the defendant’s affida
vit, given during another trial proceeding, falsely and maliciously
defamed the plaintiff.89 The court firmly resolved that witnesses
were immune from damage claims and asserted that it based its de
cision on numerous legal authorities rooted in centuries of judgemade legal jurisprudence.90 Holding otherwise, the court stated,
84. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1983); Henderson v. Broomhead,
(1859) 157 Eng. Rep. 964 (Exch.) 968 (refusing to recognize a cause of action against
witnesses who testify in court even if their speech is defamatory and malicious); Revis v.
Smith, (1856) 139 Eng. Rep. 1314 (C.P.) 1314 (stating that “[n]o action lies against a
man for a statement made by him, whether by affidavit or [verbally], in the course of a
judicial proceeding, even [if the statement is false or malicious] ‘and without any rea
sonable or probable cause’”); Anfield v. Feverhill, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B.)
(holding that witnesses are immune from damages liability for their testimony in trial);
Cutler v Dixon, (1585) 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B.) 887-88 (denying the plaintiff’s claim
because “if actions should be permitted [against witnesses], those who have just cause
for complaint, would not dare to complain for fear of infinite vexation”).
85. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (citing Henderson, 157 Eng. Rep. at 968-69); see also
Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1998) (stating that retaliation against an em
ployee at will for testifying in court may ‘“injure [the employee] in his person or prop
erty’” and in turn subjects the employer to civil liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(quoting Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2006))).
86. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 n.13.
87. Id. at 331-32; see supra note 84.
88. Henderson, 157 Eng. Rep. at 968.
89. Id. at 967.
90. Id. at 968.
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would undermine witnesses’ willingness “to speak freely” resulting
in “great mischief [for the] Courts of justice.”91
Similarly, the Supreme Court affirmed this well-established
common law principle in Briscoe v. LaHue. 92 There, the Court held
that a police officer was immune from civil liability suits under 42
U.S.C. § 198393 based on his allegedly perjurious testimony at a
criminal trial.94 Briscoe, the plaintiff, had been convicted of bur
glarizing a house trailer.95 Briscoe claimed that LaHue, the defen
dant, lied at Briscoe’s trial when he testified that Briscoe was one
out of fifty to a hundred people “whose prints would match a par
tial thumbprint” found at the crime scene.96 Briscoe insisted that
the testimony was perjurious, because the FBI and state police had
deemed the partial thumbprint evidence unreliable.97
The Court noted that the legislators, by enacting this section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, intended to extend the same protec
tion from damage claims to trial witnesses as they had under the
common law.98 The policy rationale behind this rule was to allow
“the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth [to be] as free
and unobstructed as possible,” so that the judicial truth-seeking
mission may be best served.99 In addition, the Court observed that
protecting witnesses from damage liability is essential, especially in
light of a witness’ non-negotiable duty to testify.100 The rule pro
tected witnesses as well as other integral players in the judicial pro
cess, such “as judges, sheriffs, and marshals,” and applied to both
public officials and private citizens.101 Generally, all those who
played a crucial role in the judicial system were immune from civil
suits.102 Applying this common law rationale to a public em
ployee’s truthful testimony would avoid current variant outcomes
and confusion as shown in the next Section.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 325.
Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330.
Id. at 333 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)).
Id.
Id. at 341 n.26.
Id. at 330-31.
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GARCETTI

A. Fully Protecting Truthful Testimony
Even pre-Garcetti, courts’ divergent perspectives on the notion
of “matters of public concern,” pertinent to testimonial speech,
yielded inconsistent results.103 Some courts viewed truthful testi
mony as another form of run-of-the-mill speech, and as such, they
relied squarely on the content of testimony to determine whether it
deserved protection.104 Others focused their analysis on the context
in which the testimony was made.105 They argued that because tes
timonial speech was compulsory and given before a fact-finding or
judicial body, it was inherently a matter of public concern; thus it
enjoyed full First Amendment protection.106 Others took the mid
dle road, reasoning that truthful testimony deserved heightened but
not per se protection.107
The justification for the per se “matters of public concern” ap
proach is that to allow an employer to retaliate against an employee
for testifying would discourage that person from speaking truthfully
and undermine the judicial system.108 Johnston v. Harris County
Flood Control District stands in the forefront of the line of cases
that have adopted the per se test; courts faced with claims of the per
se rule have relied substantially on this case.109 Carl Johnston
worked for the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFD).110
He testified at an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) hearing
on behalf of a co-worker and against his employer.111 After his tes
103. See supra note 7.
104. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2004); Arvinger v.
Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that if a testimonial statement
does not involve issues of public concern, it is not protected).
105. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir.
1989); Reeves v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987).
106. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.
107. Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505-07 (7th
Cir. 1994).
108. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.
109. Catletti v. Rampe, 334 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Johnston’s per se
rule); see also Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1999);
Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1289 (3d Cir. 1996) (extending a per se rule relying on
Johnston); Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505; Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 483 (10th Cir.
1994). But see Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 925-27, 926 n.6 (cit
ing Johnston but specifically not deciding whether or not to accept a per se rule).
110. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1568.
111. Id.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE212.txt

638

unknown

Seq: 16

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

5-OCT-11

14:39

[Vol. 33:623

timony, he was subjected to myriad retaliatory actions112 that even
tually resulted in his termination.113
Subsequently, he sued his former employer, alleging a violation
of his First Amendment liberty to testify freely.114 The testimony in
question addressed a personal dispute between Johnston’s co
worker and the HCFD.115 However, the court held it was immate
rial that the content of Johnston’s testimonial speech dealt with a
private issue.116 Rather, the court explained that the controlling
factor for its constitutional protection was the context because
“[w]hen a [public] employee testifies before an official government
adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is in
herently of public concern.”117
Seven years later, in Pro v. Donatucci,118 another circuit ex
panded the notion of the per se rule by applying it to “would-be
testimony” concerning a purely private matter.119 In a case of first
impression, the court held that responding to a subpoena enjoys
First Amendment protection much like truthful testimony because,
contextually, it constitutes speech on a matter of public concern.120
Sisinia Pro worked as a secretary for Ronald Donatucci, Register of
Wills in Philadelphia.121 Donatucci’s wife subpoenaed Pro to testify
in her divorce action against her husband.122 Pro appeared in court
to testify but did not have the opportunity to do so.123 A short time
112. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., No. H-82-21729, 1986 WL
14438, at *1-3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 1986). The United States District Court found that
Johnston had worked for HCFD for thirty years. Id. at *1. His job performance, al
though not stellar, was on par with that of the other county workers. Id. The evidence
revealed that the HCFD’s retaliatory actions after his testimony included giving him
assignments unrelated to his position, such as clerical duties or “strenuous field work.”
Id. In addition, his supervisors had moved him around to several office environments
that were “less desirable” than his regular office. Id. One year, he was the only em
ployee in the HCFD that did not get the raise of twelve percent. Id. Finally, upon his
refusal to accept a demotion, HCFD fired him. Id. at *2.
113. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1568.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1577.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1578.
118. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1289 (3d Cir. 1996).
119. Id. Would-be testimony referred to Pro’s testimony, which was scheduled to
occur but did not take place. Id.
120. Id. at 1291.
121. Id. at 1285.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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later, she was discharged from her post due to “an on-going depart
ment reorganization.”124 Pro brought a section 1983 action125
against Donatucci alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of her
First Amendment rights.126
The court posited “that the context of [courtroom testimony]
raise[d] the speech to a level of public concern regardless of its con
tent.”127 Its ruling relied on two important considerations: public
employees’ interests in testifying truthfully and the judicial interest
in having them testify without fearing retaliation.128 Reiterating
that testimony deserves protection, despite the nature of the
speech, the court reasoned that the crux of the matter boiled down
to “control,” or lack thereof.129 A public employee may choose to
comment or not on an issue that is likely to trigger retribution from
his or her supervisor.130 But “[a] subpoenaed witness” is compelled
to appear at trial, or, in the alternative, face contempt of court.131
Thus, retaliating against employees for acts that they are legally ob
ligated to fulfill is unjust.132 Furthermore, no distinction exists be
tween retaliating against an employee who actually testifies at trial
or one who appears in order to testify but does not.133 Lastly, the
court concluded that this protection was not without exception, but
subject to the Pickering balancing test, which weighs the interest of
the employee in speaking on a matter of public concern against that
of the employer in regulating the speech.134

124. Id.
125. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The
statute states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Pro, 81 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1291 n.4.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1291 n.4.
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B. Protecting Truthful Testimony Only When it Advances a
Public Concern
The Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City court refused to automati
cally grant First Amendment protection to a policeman’s truthful
testimony, relying on the rationale that testimony concerning pri
vate issues did not deserve protection.135 Carl Kirby, a police of
ficer, testified in front of the City Personnel Appeals Committee
regarding a grievance that his co-worker had filed in response to
the disciplinary actions taken against the co-worker for damaging a
patrol car.136 In his testimony, Kirby discussed the maintenance
history of the patrol car and his assessment of the officer’s habits in
maintaining and driving the car.137
Kirby’s testimony signaled the beginning of a slew of discipli
nary actions against him.138 Shortly after testifying, he “received an
oral reprimand for ‘[f]ailure to support the Department’s Adminis
tration.’”139 He was eventually demoted to a lower position for
“poor job performance” and failure to comply with proper policies
and procedures.140 He asserted that this treatment was in retalia
tion for his testimony before the committee.141 After filing a griev
ance the Appeals Committee reinstated Kirby to his previous
position.142 He maintained, however, that his supervisors contin
ued to retaliate against him by giving him menial tasks.143 Kirby
finally brought suit against his employer.144
Focusing solely on the content of Kirby’s testimony, the court
did not grant him First Amendment protection because his testi
mony addressed a private matter.145 Kirby posited that issues such
as the reliability of the car and his co-worker’s negligence in main
taining the car’s transmission fluids involved private interests.146
135. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2004). Courts
have characterized truthful testimony related to private interests as speech aimed at
simply furthering the plaintiff’s personal concerns, distinguishing it from speech ad
dressing issues of public concern. Id.; see also Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt., 862 F.2d 75,
79 (4th Cir. 1988).
136. Kirby, 388 F.3d at 443.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 444.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 445.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 450.
146. Id. at 447.
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The court further explained that testimony given in a public hearing
did not automatically become a matter of public concern.147 In
stead, the key issue was whether the testimony served to further a
public debate or merely advanced the private interests of the public
employee in question.148 Although the safety standards of a police
car were at stake, the court did not regard this issue as advancing a
public debate.149 As such, it deemed the issue not a matter of pub
lic concern.150
IV.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-GARCETTI

A. Protecting Truthful Testimony as Citizen Speech
The courts’ decisions post-Garcetti reflects two distinct inter
pretations of the Supreme Court’s rulings. Some courts hold that
testimony given pursuant to a public employee’s official duties is
speech that belongs to the government, thus it is not protected de
spite its context.151 Others opine that testifying truthfully at a judi
cial trial is every citizen’s obligation.152 Consequently, full
protection is granted because “[w]hen a government employee tes
tifies truthfully, [he] is not ‘simply performing his . . . job duties[;]’
rather, [he] is acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates of the
court . . . .”153
Indeed, the Reilly v. City of Atlantic City Court adopted the
latter rationale in reaching its decision.154 Robert Reilly worked
for the Atlantic City Police Department for twenty-five years.155 In
the course of his employment, he testified as a witness for the pros
ecution in a trial concerning department corruption indirectly in
volving his supervisor.156 Reilly had obtained information about
the corruption while he worked as an investigator for the depart
ment.157 He was later charged with several disciplinary violations,
including making disparaging comments to a colleague.158 Upon
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
(2006)).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009).
Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 231 (citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 221.
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reviewing the evidence, an independent hearing officer recom
mended that Reilly be suspended for four days.159 But, his two su
pervisors demoted him instead.160 Finally, Reilly resigned, and,
subsequently, he filed a section 1983 lawsuit.161 Reilly asserted that
his supervisors retaliated against him because of his previous testi
mony in the police corruption case where one of them was in
volved.162 His supervisors pleaded that they were entitled to
qualified immunity because, consistent with Garcetti, Reilly’s trial
testimony was not protected speech because it stemmed from his
official job duties.163
The court disagreed and stated that the Supreme Court’s pre
cedent “settled principles” of our jurisprudence, and that the
Court’s judgment supported the conclusion that Reilly’s testimony
was citizen speech deserving full protection.164 The court posited
that this conclusion was rooted in the axiom “that ‘[e]very citizen
. . . owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the
enforcement of the law.’”165 Since the substance of Reilly’s testi
mony had been obtained on the job, the question before the court
was whether a public employee’s testimonial speech stemming from
his job duties deserved constitutional protection.166 The Third Cir
cuit stated that, when a public employee testifies “[he] is not ‘simply
performing his . . . job duties[;]’ rather, [he] is acting as a citizen
. . . .”167 Thus, per Reilly, a public employee’s testimony is consid
ered citizen speech because when a public employee testifies, his
citizen duty prevails over his employee duty.168
In a similar vein, the court limited Garcetti’s reach “to the
question whether Reilly spoke as a citizen when he testified . . . .”169
The court also pointed out that the Garcetti ruling only applied to
the speech embodied in plaintiff Ceballos’s internal memorandum
and not to the issue of truthful testimony.170 Identifying as the dis
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
(2006)).
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 222.
at 224.
at 226-27.
at 231.
at 228 (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961)).
at 231 (citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423

Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 231.
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positive factor the fact that Reilly testified at trial in his capacity as
a citizen, the court concluded that his testimony was protected.171
B. No Immunity if Truthful Testimony is Made Pursuant to
Official Duties
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg agreed with Garcetti’s “official du
ties” rationale, by holding that the truthful testimony of a public
employee is not protected when given as an extension of his official
duties.172 In 1991, Ron Huppert started working as a patrol officer
and an inspector for the Pittsburg Police Department (PPD).173
While working as a police officer, he was called to assist in investi
gating corruption at the Pittsburg Public Works Yard.174 Huppert
maintained “that [f]rom that time on, my superiors [at the PPD]
treated me with scorn and as an outcast.”175 A year later, Huppert
took the sergeant’s exam, but he did not get promoted even though
he scored high on the test.176 His supervisor told him that he did
not become a sergeant because he had a goatee.177
In the following years while still working for the PPD, Huppert
was engaged in an FBI investigation about alleged corruption
within the department.178 He asserted that his work for the FBI
was unrelated to his PPD position.179 Subsequently, he was trans
ferred “to a building known within the PPD as the Penal Colony,
because disaffected and/or disfavored officers were assigned
there.”180 Huppert’s new supervisor told him that he had been sent
there because Huppert’s former supervisor wanted to fire
Huppert.181
In 2004, Huppert was subpoenaed to testify before a civil grand
jury in charge of investigating corruption in the PPD.182 Shortly
thereafter, he was transferred from his position as a gang investiga
tor to a fraud and forgeries investigator, with an increased wor
171. Id. at 227-28. Also, the court did not address whether Reilly’s testimony
constituted a matter of public concern because it upheld the district court’s affirmative
ruling on the matter. Id. at 228.
172. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009).
173. Id. at 698.
174. Id. at 698-99.
175. Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 700.
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kload.183 He claimed that his transfer “was initiated simply as a
method of harassment.”184 Huppert and the Patrol Officers Associ
ation were finally forced to file a grievance against the PPD after
Huppert’s superior “attempted to replace Huppert’s superlative
yearly evaluation,” conducted by another sergeant, with an evalua
tion Huppert’s superior had prepared.185 Huppert eventually re
tired on disability.186
With regard to Huppert’s testimony before the grand jury, the
court determined that his testimony was not protected because it
flowed from his official duties.187 The court further explained that
speech pursuant to one’s official duties is distinguished from speech
as a private citizen because it “does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”188 The court
disagreed with the Reilly rationale and refused to follow its ruling,
claiming that it unjustifiably chipped away at the Garcetti
holding.189
Furthermore, the court asserted that, in California, police of
ficers have an official duty to testify.190 The court relied on Christal
v. Police Commission of San Francisco, which predated Garcetti,
stating that, in accordance with California law, police officers must
testify freely in front of a grand jury.191 The Huppert court stated,
however, that its holding did not categorically foreclose the possi
bility of protecting a police officer’s speech.192 An exception might
be made, if, for example, speech revealed corruption of which expo
sure was paramount in the proper functioning of the government’s
duties.193 Finally, the court stated that other avenues, like “whistle
blower” statutes, existed to remedy reprisal that resulted from re
porting government corruption.194

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 708.
Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 720; Christal v. Police Comm’n of S.F., 92 P.2d 416, 418-19 (1939).
Huppert, 574 F.3d at 709.
Id.
Id. at 710.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE212.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

5-OCT-11

DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU DON’T

V.

14:39

645

SAFEGUARDING TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY

A. Protecting Public Employees and the Integrity of Our Justice
System: The Need for Constitutional Protection
In the current Garcetti-free speech climate, where the govern
ment is unrestrained to retaliate against public employees for testi
fying truthfully, unfettered First Amendment protection is
necessary. Presently, public employees face a triple dilemma195:
testifying truthfully and losing their jobs; lying under oath and com
mitting perjury; or refusing to testify and thus facing contempt.
Testifying is a civic duty, autonomous of a public employee’s job
obligations.196 As Judge Fletcher stated in his Huppert dissenting
opinion, “[t]he fact that the employer may require its employees to
obey a law that exists independent of the employment relationship
does not allow the employer to retaliate against an employee for
obeying that law.”197 Arriving at the truth requires some guaran
tees that the one who testifies will not be penalized.198 Punishing
employees for speaking truthfully while complying with an obliga
tory civic duty goes against the grain of fairness and decreases the
efficiency of our judicial system.199
The Supreme Court has not specifically deliberated on the is
sue of truthful testimony but has intimated that it regards a public
employee’s truthful testimony as a unique type of speech distinct
from the others.200 Indeed, the Court has recognized that a public
employee’s testimony regarding government policies falls within
the realm of protected speech.201 In Perry v. Sindermann, the
plaintiff, a professor in the Texas state college system, who also
served as the president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Asso
ciation for a short time, had testified on several occasions before
committees of the Texas Legislature against his college’s policies.202
When his annual employment contract was not renewed, the plain
tiff alleged retaliation for his critical testimonies.203 The Court ob
served that the plaintiff’s “allegations present[ed] a bona fide
constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher’s public
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 709; Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
Huppert, 574 F.3d at 709-10.
Id. at 722 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
See Wells, supra note 2, at 960.
Huppert, 574 F.3d at 722 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006).
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
Id. at 594-95.
Id.

R
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criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be con
stitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible ba
sis for termination of his employment.”204
In the same vein, the lower courts that have adopted this ratio
nale have reasoned that truthful testimony, which is often compul
sory, differs from other forms of speech.205 As the Third Circuit
pointed out, the crux of the issue is control.206 Because a public
employee cannot choose to avoid testifying without facing conse
quences, retaliation in this context would be unjust.207 It is there
fore imperative that truthful testimony receive First Amendment
protection.208 This protection would also align with the doctrine of
the separation of powers and help support the judicial system’s mis
sion of discovering the truth by disallowing government intrusion in
the affairs of the judiciary.209
Moreover, affording constitutional protection to truthful testi
mony is compelling seeing that whistleblower statutes, albeit well
intentioned, are ineffective. But, some courts dismissing violation
of freedom of speech claims do not hesitate to use the existence of
whistleblower statutes as a pretext for denying protection.210 In
deed, there are about forty whistleblower protection statutes, but,
despite this impressive number, more has proven less for federal
whistleblowers.211 The Government Accountability Office has re
ported that the whistleblower redress system is “adversarial, ineffi
cient, time-consuming, and costly.”212 As a matter of fact,
whistleblowers lose their cases so often that some advocates advise
204. Id. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
205. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. This should include truthful testimony in the context of administrative,
civil, or criminal trial. Id.
209. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). This represents the other side
of the coin of the concern the Court observed regarding principles of federalism and
separation of powers. In Garcetti, the concern was that to hold the government respon
sible for regulating speech stemming out of an employee’s official duties would create
“permanent judicial intervention” into the government’s activity. Id. However, to al
low the government to constantly interfere into the judiciary’s operation by retaliating
against employees’ truthful testimonies involves the same violation of the separation of
powers’ principle. See id.
210. Id. at 425; Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 710 (9th Cir. 2009);
Garcia, supra note 21, at 22-23.
211. Katel, supra note 80, at 269-71.
212. A System in Need of Reform,, supra note 80, at 3; An Opportunity for Reform, supra note 80, at 3.
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whistleblowers to report anonymously to the press instead of fol
lowing the regular redress protocol.213
Analogously, in his Garcetti dissenting opinion, Justice Souter
noted that common law and statutory protections available to pub
lic employees are “patchwork” and of little value.214 Indeed, in
many cases involving on-duty speech that have resulted in the gov
ernment’s victory, no other remedies have been available to public
employees.215 Therefore, in the interest of disallowing government
intrusion into the judiciary process, and since the current statutory
framework has failed to guard public employees against reprisal,
the constitutional protection of truthful testimony should become a
priority.
The common law approach of witnesses’ immunization, aiming
at preserving the integrity of the judicial system, should apply to
truthful testimony.216 The roots of this tradition are “well grounded
in history and reason.”217 Recognizing the paramount importance
of testimonial speech, Congress codified the common law by mak
ing false testimony given under oath a crime.218 The Supreme
Court has resolved to protect testimonial speech outside the First
213. Katel, supra note 80, at 265. In 2006, Thomas Devine, legal director of the
Governmental Accountability Project, told the CQ Researcher that from 1994 to 2005,
only one out of 120 Federal Circuit decisions that whistleblowers filed favored the pub
lic employee. Id. at 270. A Federal Circuit landmark case, Lachance v. White, set the
tone for this unsuccessful rate when it ruled that a whistleblower can have a reasonable
claim only if “a disinterested observer” attests to the government’s gross mismanage
ment. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Ever since, any witness
testifying for the government has resulted in the plaintiff’s defeat. Katel, supra note 80,
at 270. Furthermore, from 1999 to 2006, employees won only two out of fifty-two
MSPB cases. Id.
214. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Garcia, supra note 21, at
25 (“[S]tatutory protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and sometimes
counterproductive for public employees.”); see also A System in Need of Reform, supra
note 80, at 3; An Opportunity for Reform, supra note 80, at 3 (evidencing the inefficiency of the whistleblower redress system).
215. Garcia, supra note 21, at 25-26.
216. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1983).
217. Id. at 334 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
Whoever–
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testi
mony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, will
fully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which
he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, will
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Amendment context.219 The cases that grant trial witnesses full im
munity from civil damage claims illustrates the Court’s favorable
position on testimony.220 The rationale for this protection hinged
on the likelihood that a witness’s fear of damages liability may lead
to self-censorship which, in turn, would jeopardize the justice sys
tem’s mission of discovering the truth.221
In the interest of the truth-finding process, a parallel approach
should apply to safeguarding a government worker’s truthful testi
mony. Public employees are vulnerable to job retaliation as a result
of testimony their employers may regard as unfavorable.222 Fearing
their jobs are in jeopardy, or worse, the loss of their livelihoods,
they may be inclined to adjust their testimonies to be more palat
able to their employers.223 The fear of retaliation and employerinduced witness intimidation against employees is real.224 Indeed,
the Supreme Court characterized “[t]he danger of witness intimida
tion” of an employer over its employee as “acute.”225 The Court
noted that “[n]ot only can the employer fire the employee, but job
fully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be
true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This
section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or
without the United States.
Id.
219. Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1998) (stating that an at-will em
ployee who suffered retaliation for obeying a federal grand-jury subpoena was entitled
to damage claims); Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31.
220. See supra note 219.
221. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (“A witness’ apprehension of subsequent damages
liability might induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant
to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be
distorted by the fear of subsequent liability.” (citation omitted)).
222. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th
Cir.1989).
223. Id.
224. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 240 (1978); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-70, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: VA DID
LITTLE UNTIL RECENTLY TO INFORM EMPLOYEES ABOUT THEIR RIGHTS 3 (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00070.pdf (stating that fear of retaliation
could deter Veteran Affairs employees from coming forth with claims of misconduct).
Only twenty-one percent of Veteran Affairs employees reported that protection against
retaliation was reasonably sufficient. Survey of Federal Employees on Civil Service,
supra note 80, at 3 (stating that fear of retaliation “for reporting misconduct continues
to be a concern for many federal employees”). Thirty-six percent reported that protec
tion against retaliation was inadequate and thirteen percent believed it was sufficient.
Id. at 4. Twenty-five percent thought that they would be retaliated against for reporting
misconduct. Id.
225. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 240.
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assignments can be switched, hours can be adjusted, wage and sal
ary increases held up, and other more subtle forms of influence ex
erted.”226 Out of the fear of retribution, public employees may
“magnify uncertainties, and thus . . . deprive the finder of fact of
candid, objective, and undistorted evidence,”227 which would have
undesirable consequences for the integrity of our justice system.228
B. Truthful Testimony is Inherently a Matter of Public Concern
The Supreme Court, in Connick and Rankin, deemed that the
context alone may elevate speech to a matter of public concern.229
The context of a statement is one of three elements courts take into
account to determine whether a public employee’s speech involves
a matter of public concern.230 In Connick, the Court stated that
context, which is determined by the time, place, and manner of
speech, is one factor that may determine whether speech is a matter
of public concern.231 However, the Court held that context did not
elevate the plaintiff’s questionnaire to the level of public con
cern.232 This was because the plaintiff prepared the questionnaire
while in her office, on the government’s time, engaging other co
workers to complete the questionnaire during their working
hours—thus increasing the chances of office disruption.233
Similarly, the Rankin Court analyzed the context of plaintiff’s
speech, but in contrast with Connick, it found that the context in
which she uttered her remark was the sole factor for classifying her
statement a matter of public concern.234 Rankin’s remark about the
United States President “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get
him,” received protection because she said it while discussing the
President’s welfare policies.235
226. Id.
227. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1983).
228. Id.
229. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147-48 (1983).
230. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that a matter of public concern is mea
sured by “content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record”).
231. Id. at 153 (“[T]he context in which the dispute arose is also significant.”).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381-386.
235. Id. at 387. The Court also considered the plaintiff’s rank in the constable’s
office. Id. at 390-91. Determining that Rankin held a low-level position, the Court
observed that her statement could not cause office disruption. Id.
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Analogously, compelled testimonial speech is contextually a
per se matter of public concern.236 That is because testimony given
before a judicial body pursuant to a civic duty, during the time set
by the court, and in accordance with the rules of evidence, is inher
ently important to the public. The Fifth Circuit reached the same
conclusion when it decided that the context of the plaintiff’s testi
mony guaranteed its protection.237 The court noted that “[u]nder
certain circumstances . . . the context in which the employee speaks
may be sufficient to elevate the speech to the level of public
concern.”238
In addition, even when a public employee testified on a merely
private matter, such as her supervisor’s extramarital affair, the testi
mony was protected.239 Because the duty to testify is often not only
compulsory but also has significant civic importance,240 context
alone should be the determining factor, because it is context which
elevates testimony to a matter of public concern.241 Adopting a
bright-line rule would avoid confusion and unpredictable results,
thereby benefiting public employees, the government, and our jus
tice system.
The “inherent matter of public concern” rule should apply to
truthful testimony, but it should not include a public employee’s
testimony about his own grievances as these cases deal with private
employment disputes.242 Naturally, a per se matter of public con
236. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th
Cir.1989); Michael, supra note 5, at 442.
237. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578 (“When an employee testifies before an official
government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is inherently
of public concern.”).
238. Id. at 1577.
239. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir.1996).
240. The notion that testifying in court is a civic duty is grounded in Supreme
Court precedent. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1974). In United States
v. Nixon the Court, asserting that “presumptive privilege for Presidential communica
tions” is not absolute because every citizen is obligated to obey the rule of law,
observed:
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both funda
mental and comprehensive. . . . The very integrity of the judicial system and
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it
is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for
the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense.
Id.
241. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1577.
242. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“employment grievances in which the employee is complaining about her own job treat
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cern should be subject to the Pickering test, which balances a public
employee’s right to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern
with the government’s interest in effectively performing its du
ties.243 But a public employee’s involuntary, truthful testimony
should be given compelling weight, and the government’s interest
should prevail only in cases of extreme importance.244
C. Truthful Testimony Pursuant to a Public Employee’s Job
Duties Should be Protected
This part of the Note argues that the Garcetti decision that
speech pursuant to one’s official duties enjoys no protection does
not pertain to truthful testimony. Garcetti placed an additional ob
stacle in the way of a public employee’s First Amendment claim.245
Indeed, this decision has added another layer of jurisprudential
murkiness to the already muddled waters of public employees’
speech.246 The “official duties” test has created confusion on the
ment” are not safeguarded because they fall under the category of private employment
disputes).
243. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
244. Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1999). A public employee
testimony is involuntary or compelled when his official duty compels him to testify.
Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit con
cluded that the Law Enforcement Training Academy’s interest outweighed the deputy
director’s free speech interest because the voluntary deposition testimony disrupted the
relationship equilibrium in the academy. Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1215. In the same vein,
the Third Circuit distinguished between voluntary and involuntary testimony by attach
ing less weight to a police officer’s First Amendment interest because he had testified
voluntary. Green, 105 F.3d at 888. The court argued that his voluntary testimony had
created tension and mistrust among his colleagues, thereby undermining the efficient
operation of the police department. Id.
245. Hudson, supra note 32, at 16 (asserting that Garcetti has undermined a public employee’s ability to vindicate against retaliation against speech on a matter of pub
lic concern); see also Chemerinksy, supra note 68, at 539.
246. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 426-31 (2006) (Souter, J., dissent
ing). The majority in Garcetti did not regard it useful to define a public employee’s job
duties, observing that “job descriptions” rarely resemble an employee’s day-to-day job
duties. Id. at 424-25 (majority opinion). Consequently, the Court opted to adopt a
case-by-case approach which, albeit plausible in theory, leads to ad-hoc results in prac
tice. And the dissent’s prediction that failure to define job duties would result in more
litigation has proven true. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that truthful testimony even when related to a matter of public concern
is not protected so long as it is made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties);
Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that speech not pro
tected because it flowed out of plaintiff’s duty to cooperate with the investigation);
Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that chief jailer’s testi
mony was not protected because it stemmed from his duties); Deprado v. City of
Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that police officer’s
subpoenaed grand jury testimony was not protected speech); see also Garcia, supra
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issue of protection of truthful testimony and has further eroded
public employees’ constitutional protection.247 After Garcetti, the
lower courts have been pondering the question of what constitutes
speech in the course of one’s employment.248 The answer fairly
often has resulted in the overzealous application of Garcetti and
courts’ willingness to categorize any speech in the workplace as onduty speech.249 This decision has of course had a chilling effect on
truthful testimony.250
However, Garcetti did not address the issue of truthful testi
mony and as such the courts should construe it narrowly and in
particular, they should not apply Garcetti to truthful testimony.
Garcetti’s focus of speech was the memorandum that the plaintiff, a
deputy district attorney, wrote.251 In it, he recommended the dis
missal of a case because in his assessment, the affidavit used to ob
tain the search warrant contained serious misrepresentations.252
Compiling the memorandum was clearly the plaintiff’s professional
duty, not his civic obligation; thus his speech belonged to the gov
ernment. Conversely, testimony before a fact-finding body,
prompted by a worker’s job obligation is inseparable from his testi
fying duty as a citizen and is governed by the rules of the court
note 21, at 22. But cf. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008)
(ruling that a public employee’s truthful testimony is automatically protected because
every citizen has a duty to testify); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was unquestionably not one of
Morales’ job duties. . . .”).
247. Hudson, supra note 32, at 16; Garcia, supra note 21, at 22.
248. Dale, supra note 68, at 196-200. The author, who pointed out that courts
have taken a formalist approach to Garcetti, stated:
As lower courts struggle to implement the decision, they approach Garcetti in
several ways: Some decisions emphasize process, assuming that Garcetti al
tered plaintiff’s burdens of pleading or proof. Others turn on substance, focus
ing on the employee’s position, the content of the employee’s speech, or the
audience for the employee’s statement . . . . Some ground their decision on the
employee’s status; others emphasize the content of the speech; and still others
focus on the audience at which the remarks were directed.
Id.
249. Id. at 196-97; Garcia, supra note 21, at 23-24; see also Chemerinksy, supra
note 68, at 539 (“[Garcetti] is not only a loss of free speech rights for millions of government employees, but it is really a loss for the general public, who are much less likely to
learn of government misconduct.”).
250. See Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708; Bradley, 479 F.3d at 538; Green, 226 F. App’x
at 886; Deprado, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1344; Hudson, supra note 32, at 16 (citing an attorney, representing public employees in First Amendment litigation, saying that
“[Garcetti] has resulted in a lower level of constitutional protection for many public
employees”).
251. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
252. Id. at 421.
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system. Indeed, three out of four dissenting justices—namely, Jus
tices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg—poignantly noted that not all
speech derives from one’s job duty and “the claim relating to truth
ful testimony in court must surely be analyzed independently to
protect the integrity of the judicial process.”253
Moreover, applying Garcetti to truthful testimony would not
only undermine the judiciary’s truth-seeking mission, but it may
also prove detrimental to the government’s efficient operation and
to the function of democracy. A further examination of Garcetti
reveals that the impetus for the Court’s decision was to quash the
possibility that every work-related dispute would turn into a consti
tutional claim.254 The purpose was to allow the government a
greater degree of influence over speech that damages its proper
functioning and causes disharmonious work environments.255 The
Court’s deferential treatment of the government is sensible given
that the government has an obligation to perform its duties.256 In a
democracy, the government must carry out the will of the people.257
Therefore, the government needs to manage its employees, deter
mine job expectations, and assess their performances without the
looming fear of litigation.258 The government achieves its function
through the operation of its agencies.259 In turn, public workers
whom these agencies employ implement their duties, and in ex
change for their work, receive a salary.260
To a certain extent, this contractual relationship justifies the
government’s dominion over its employees’ speech. Indeed, al
lowing every work-related gripe to turn into a constitutional issue
would paralyze the government’s activity and render its existence
useless.261 Considered on a larger scale, the very existence of de
mocracy depends on the government’s ability to perform efficiently,
hold its employees accountable and have a degree of control over
their speech. After all, the government cannot run like a public
square when acting in the role of employer.262
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 412 (majority opinion).
Id.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
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On the other hand, democracy cannot exist without public
workers’ freedom of speech and governmental accountability.263
Moreover, there is no justification for government control of a pub
lic employee’s truthful testimony. Testimony, such as that before a
criminal, civil, or administrative fact-finding body is not speech that
belongs to the government. Allowing a public employer to retaliate
against truthful testimony would sanction intrusion into the judicial
system as well as its truth-seeking mission.264 The fact that a public
employee’s official duty compels him to testify is unrelated to his
obligation as a citizen to truthful testimony. This should also apply
to those employees, such as law enforcement officers, whose duty to
testify, is part of their job descriptions because in a democratic soci
ety citizen testimony takes priority.265
Furthermore, government accountability without its employ
ees’ ability to testify freely would be an illusion. Indeed, testimo
nial censorship has undesirable consequences for the interest of the
public employee; for the integrity of our justice system; for the pub
lic’s interest in holding the government accountable for its actions;
and, certainly, for the government itself.266 The public employer
should know that, if its workers fear to testifying truthfully, the gov
ernment also pays the price in the resulting costs and inefficiencies
from not addressing misconduct and office corruption.267
In addition, Garcetti observed that public employees are not
entirely deprived of First Amendment protection for speech uttered
at work, but they have to show they spoke as citizens and not
merely within the scope of their duties.268 For example, if they take
their concerns to a public forum such as the press,269 provided that
the Pickering test is satisfied, their claims may survive.270 Conse
263. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
264. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 444 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he claim relating to
truthful testimony in court must surely be analyzed independently to protect the integ
rity of the judicial process.”).
265. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
266. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Still, the First Amendment
safeguard rests on something more, being the value to the public of receiving the opin
ions and information that a public employee may disclose.”).
267. Id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“Exposing governmental inefficiency and mis
conduct is a matter of considerable significance.”).
268. Id. at 419.
269. Hudson, supra note 32, at 17 (noting that even this is not a safe and one
hundred percent guarantee).
270. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, criti
cized this rationale stating that despite the audience, no considerable difference should
exist between speaking as a citizen and speaking within one’s scope of duty. Id. Al
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quently, because testimony is conducted in a public forum, com
pelled by every citizen’s duty to testify, the “official duties” test
does not apply. Finally, a public employee does not relinquish all
his First Amendment liberties in exchange for a paycheck.271
“[T]he Court has recognized that a citizen who works for the gov
ernment is nonetheless a citizen. The First Amendment limits . . . a
public employer . . . [from] incidentally or intentionally [restricting]
the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citi
zens.”272 Allowing the government to punish its workers for fulfil
ling their obligation as citizens to testify, under the pretext of
official speech, not only robs them of constitutionally protected
rights, but also, in effect, places them in a category of second-class
citizenry.
CONCLUSION
Not all speech is created equal. In the public employee’s First
Amendment arsenal, testimonial speech is unique because it is
made in a public forum pursuant to a civic obligation.273 Testimo
nial speech is inherently a matter of public concern and indepen
dent of a public employee’s official duties, even if his job provides
the impetus to testify. For these reasons, compelled truthful testi
mony should receive unfettered First Amendment protection.
First and foremost, at stake is the integrity of our justice sys
tem. Fear of reprisal from a vengeful boss may dissuade a witness
from testifying truthfully.274 This in turn would threaten the proper
functioning of our judicial process and lead to unjust results bethough delving further into this argument would be outside the scope of this Note it is
worthwhile to briefly mention the ramification of the majority’s rationale. First, the
public employee would essentially be addressing the same issue and the court analysis
would be identical, whether he raised it within his work’s chain of command or took it
to the press. Second, going public rather than addressing issues within the governmen
tal agency would not serve the government’s goal of operating efficiently. By contrast,
this practice could result in distraction, prove disruptive for the government’s proper
functioning, and cause unnecessary embarrassment, the very ailments that the Court
sought to avoid. Finally, in Justice Stevens’s words “it [is] perverse to fashion a new
rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before
talking frankly to their superiors,” and “it is senseless to let constitutional protection for
exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.” Id.
271. Id. at 428.
272. Id. at 419 (majority opinion) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972)).
273. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
274. Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir.
1989).
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cause this process depends largely on ascertaining the truth.275
Granting constitutional protection to a government worker’s testi
monial speech is even more compelling given the current inade
quate statutory remedy through whistleblower laws. As such, the
courts should apply the common law rationale of protection of a
witness’s testimony from damage claims to truthful testimony to a
government worker’s compelled truthful testimony.276
In addition, a law that does not protect the testimony of a pub
lic employee is not only damaging for our justice system but also for
our public employees, government, and taxpayers. In a time of re
cord governmental spending, we especially need its workers to re
port fraud, abuse, or waste. We need them to tell the truth without
fear of losing their livelihood. In the words of the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall, “vigilance is necessary to ensure that public
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse,
not because it hampers public functions but simply because superi
ors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”277 Protecting
truthful testimony is one step toward maintaining a vibrant dia
logue so crucial for the proper functioning of a democratic
government.
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